Category Archives: Grr

Leaky ethics (the real questions raised by #cablegate)

Much ink and more megabytes have been spilt over ‘cablegate’. I’ve seen some pretty shoddy attempts at an ethical analysis, so feel bold enough to try my own, in the hope of providing something more rigorous. Do point out any flaws you might find.

There have been good, bad and ugly arguments for and against the leak. Let me dismiss some ugly arguments first. Ad hominem arguments in support of the US ‘it has been wronged because it is a more ‘moral’ state’ look like dressed-up jingoism to me. Surprisingly, this is a tack taken by Mike LaBossiere.
[– edit: LaBossiere has pointed out that he isn’t making a patriotic point, rather his claim is that the leak might help bad nations, thus leading to a worse outcome than not leaking. Nonetheless, the jingoistic version has been run elsewhere. And LaBossiere’s ‘consequences’ argument relies on the leaked cables being helpful to wrongdoers.]

An ad hominem against the US (‘we must check the advance of this overweening superpower’) is just as threadbare. Such approaches have nothing of substance to say about the ethics of cablegate. The corollary is that partisan defences of the Wikileaks team as persecuted fellow netizens ignore the real issues. And the focus on the alleged character of Assange might be expedient, but  is yet another red herring. Surely, in enquiring into the ethics of cablegate, we want a solid account of which actions, if any are ethically justified, which are not, and why. Such an account needs to stand up in its own right, independent of political preferences.

One bad argument offered in favour of leaking is to point to the facility of access to the US cables. Journalists rely on this — “when these papers came into our possession, so we were honour bound to publish”. This is a bit like excusing a mugging on the basis that one’s victim was an easy target. A slight caveat here is that the US government bears some responsibility for keeping its secrets secure. But the main point stands — capability is not a solid enough justification. See the ring of Gyges for an early discussion or this angle.

Enough of the duff arguments — time to review some of the better ones. First, Wikileaks could (and does) appeal to the background principle that more openness makes for better and more democratic government. This is very plausible in a lot of cases, as shown by some of Wikileaks’ earlier releases. But is the openness –> democracy relation absolute? Can the demands of transparency overrule any claim of government officials to confidentiality? I think the transparency at all costs claim does not stand up. In a representative democracy, we can’t help but devolve some powers to officials. We rely on intermittent scrutiny (elections, parliamentary committees, enquiries) to hold policy to account, without micromanaging every executive decision. In the particular case of diplomatic traffic, I think it is self evident that a degree of discretion will enable more candour, hence better analysis, hence better decisions from our officials. Although this need for candour and confidentiality is highlighted by diplomats themselves, it is still a valid point. To be cynical for a moment: if politicians and officials were bent on wrongdoing, they would be naive to document it (unless they were Nixon). The prospect of utterly undocumented policy and process, a potential consequence of frequent leaks, looks like a greater barrier to scrutiny in the long run. For these reasons, I think the specific case of cablegate weakens Wikileaks’ general case for more freedom to publish.

Now to what might be the strongest argument for cablegate. Perhaps this leak (a minor wrong) prevents or exposes a much graver crime? This is a very common and valid moral defence for a whistleblower. It’s a common one for investigative journalists, who when able to prove ‘public interest’ can win justice in court, even if they have broken existing laws. So what are the great wrongs exposed specifically by cablegate? We can assume that any such crimes would be seized on by the media. To date, the revelations seem much more embarrassing than explosive. So no grounds yet to justify this leak. Perhaps this is the problem? Instead of a single smoking gun, Wikileaks have released a pile of slightly whiffy laundry. This does much to provoke the US, but nothing to burnish the image of press freedom.

Having concluded that Wikileaks’ actions don’t have an ethical basis, what now?

I began by dismissing crude ad hominem attacks, but I think the way out is for both the US and Wikileaks to act with better character. If the US government acted like a benign, complex institution, it could recast the tide of leaks as more of a puddle. This might involve cranking back the ‘enemy of the state’ rhetoric, owning up to some ineptitude, and downplaying the seriousness of the leak. This might turn up the heat on the state department, but would deflate Wikileaks’ ‘we’re persecuted by a superpower’ narrative, thus cooling the media furore.

For Wikileaks, a better approach might be to place less emphasis on their ‘persecution’, and fill in some details about what, exactly, cablegate is supposed to expose. In doing this they would be behaving more like traditional campaigners for democracy, many of whom don’t evade the judicial consequences of their actions, but instead confront them. Think Pankhurst, Gandhi and Mandela.

I don’t deny that some anonymous leaks (including some from Wikileaks) are needed to protect democracy. But the case of cablegate is more like a vain attempt to make waves by splashing in the froth.

Why are smaller targets easier to hit?

I’ve been thinking today about a very ‘open’ project or goal with multiple paths to success can be harder to achieve (or get started on) than a more constrained project (a smaller target, if you will).

If anything is possible, deciding which way to proceed can involve interminable agonising.

I thought of this problem in relation to our recent cycle journey, where some of our toughest moments have been when we’ve had to um and ah over near-identical options. And often, having enough resources (time, money, information, energy) to take any course has made deciding that bit harder. If we’d been working to a tight schedule, or had a very fixed daily mileage, some decisions would have been much easier. But of course our trip would have been very different then – most probably, a lot less enjoyable.

So often, having a limited range of options is a vital heuristic. Cutting down the list of possible actions is a crucial step in greasing the slope and getting on with it.

A particular problem I’ve been aware of recently is that of having too much information. This is an ever-present danger with mobile internet. One could spend days trawling Google for yet more angles or the vicarious experiences of forum posters and reviewers. This approach can seem safer than plunging in, but it can be very paralysing, and not terribly enlightening after all. Sometimes you have to find your own route up the mountain.

Though this thinking bubbled up in relation to a recent outdoor adventure, it is equally applicable to my other interests – philosophical enquiry and design. In both these cases, some limitations are needed before the problem-solving can begin. Some of my best design work has grown out of very restrictive briefs. And there’s nothing like a clearly-phrased thesis to generate a solid philosophical argument.

So next time you’re stumped, why not take some options off the table? Or at least, set a strict time limit for your option-gathering phase. It might make your target smaller, but it gives you something to aim at.

Four plagues which afflict analytic philosophy

Are we making philosophy harder and less popular than we need to? A recent public philosophy lecture in London made me wonder whether analytic philosophy is going the right way.

At the lecture, an early-career philosopher was taken to task by some older colleagues for ‘marching on the spot’, ie spending time attacking a position which didn’t really deserve such a sustained treatment. I have also recently heard of a professional philosopher who lamented that within the modern analytic tradition, ‘postgraduate conferences are about spending as much time as possible saying as little as possible’. And an article here asks similar questions.

I do accept that part of the magic of philosophy is that it does not shy away from asking unanswerable questions. It’s also true that, as a mature (even ancient) discipline, we modern philosophers are left with the toughest questions of all. However I think that if we’re not careful, analytic philosophers can let some killer assumptions trap us into fulfilling the stereotype of philosophy as being ‘a lot of hot air’. Or, as David Hill has described it: “the ungainly attempt to tackle questions that come naturally to children, using methods that come naturally to lawyers”.

In my view, we make the situation worse by assuming we are worse off than we actually are. By narrowly constraining what constitute acceptable: philosophical questions, philosophical answers, philosophical ambitions, and philosophical people, we reduce the resources available to us. Let me unpack that list a little.

Poverty of questions

What I mean by this is the self-defeating feeling that ‘all the best questions have already been posed’. It is true that the Ancient Greeks opened up many of the most important and fascinating lines of enquiry right in the beginning. But that shouldn’t make us conclude that no new philosophical questions can be asked today. We have also ceded large areas of enquiry to sciences and ‘sciences’. I recently read a popular book on economics whose cover blurb asserted that ‘moral theory tries to say what people should do. Economics says what they actually do’. And yet the book contained a clutch of assumptions about empricical methods which any philosopher could have questioned.

Poverty of answers

By ‘answers’ I mean that we have overtightened the definition of what consitutes a viable argument or explanation of a philosophical problem. In particular, we have become hemmed in by science, both empirical verifiable data (a reasonable limit, perhaps) but also broadly agreed hypotheses. It’s right that philosophical theories should not fly in the face of scientific data, and I wouldn’t go as far to recommend any argument as being philosophically viable. But are we sometimes too cautious?

Poverty of ambition and scale

A few hundred years ago, philosophers were concerned to build complete philosophical systems (Spinoza being a famous example). Any philosopher who states such an aim these days would be laughed off the field. As with answers, we should be cautious about what we claim. But not over-cautious. In my view, one reason why we still read Ancient Greek philosophers is not because they got it all right (they didn’t) but because they engaged ambitiously with a broad sweep of problems. A mountaineering analogy might help here — consider the contrast between ‘I put up an E9 sport route in the SW corner of my local quarry’ and ‘I climbed the highest unknown peak in Siberia’. We should balance the natural desire to aim at completeness with a respect for scale.

Poverty of people

A major self-fulfilling prophecy which afflicts philosophy at the moment is that it is ‘just for philosophers’. This has always seemed odd to me. I like to remind friends who ask why I study the subject that all children are natural philosophers. By encouraging the mistaken view that ‘only philosophers can do philosophy’ we are limiting the number of people who might otherwise take an interest in our project. I am encouraged, though, by projects like Philosophy Bites, The Philosophy Shop, and others. I think every philosophy department should be giving some time to this kind of project. One caveat here: no need to make philosophy risible in order to attract the public (eg avoid: The Philosophy of Avatar).

All this said, I am sure that I will pick up some dry and modest-sounding topic for my postgraduate work. But let’s hope I season it with some tastier philosophy.

What do you think?

Top biking tip

My usually faithful bike has been spitting off its chain recently. Time for a clean and adjustment, I think. Had a brainwave on the way in this morning- rather than get oily fingers, I used one of my tyre levers to flick the chain back on.

[Apologies if this seems a very obvious fix; I think it useful enough to share!]

Going for gold

Right now I’m working with a client to fine-tune their yellow/orange-coloured logo. We’ve got something we’re happy with on screen, but achieving it on print is quite a bit trickier.
Most of the usual tricks- matching to swatches, speccing a Pantone ink, etc work well for volume printing but are an unlikely prospect with a small local printer.
Also, the yellow/orange shade is a tough one to get right in print.We’ll see which of my range of options work out- we may have to be realistic and choose a shade which is more ‘flexible’.

Died another day

Watched Die Another Day on arrival in Norfolk. Bond at Christmas is a bit of a tradition. Now, every Bond film stretches credulity a fair bit, but I thought this one was sillier than usual (think car chase round a hotel made of rapidly-melting ice in Iceland, where the cars don’t show a scratch!). It was worse for it.

Hard luck

Just had a new hard drive fitted to my nearly-new Macbook, after the original one suddenly died. I feel a mixture of emotions:

  • Sad that I had to fork out for a new one
  • Glad that I didn’t lose any data
  • Glad that I had a (reasonably) recent backup
  • Glad that the repair was quick and effective
  • A bit bemused that something so useful and ubiquitous (my laptop) can come a cropper so easily
  • Guardian Unlimited | Comment is free | A police state? Crying wolf wont protect civil liberties

    Guardian Unlimited | Comment is free | A police state? Crying wolf wont protect civil liberties

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    Here’s what I think:

     A couple of dangerous assumptions here:

    1. We used to have far fewer protections for civil liberties, so we shouldn’t complain about the present situation

    2. New technology allows new intrusions to civil liberties- we should intervene in new ways because we can

    I also think the writer is wrong to put (fully justified) anxieties about automatic and compulsory state collection of personal information (id cards, DNA databases etc) and the more questionable libertarian right to smoke in a public place in the same boat.

    Where does this assumption that collecting reams of personal data for no immediate use has some kind of benefit come from?

    I think the writer is quite right to say that the debate on civil liberties should be nuanced, and that both left and right can get it wrong by being too shrill. However, he then goes on to muddy the waters with some of his own faulty logic…

    Train strain to Vienna

    Travelling by train from London to Vienna and back. All quite exciting, save for a few gripes: had to stomp round Gare de l’Est in search of a cash machine at 10pm last night (thought I’d get a good value exchange by waiting ’til I got to euro land…) The night train from Paris to Munich was pretty grim- no couchette on the cheap ticket! Slept in 5-minute snatches. Not feeling too shattered though.

    On the train from Munich to Vienna, discover that Deustche Bahn have given me a ticket from Hanover to Brussels (odd since I go nowhere near those places!), and omitted to give me any tickets for the bit from Munich to Vienna and back. The German ticket inspector gives the closest he can come to a ‘bof!’, but the Austrian one demands that I buy a new ticket. A bit of a pickle as he can’t take cards and I’m 40 cents short- a good samaritan fellow passenger very kindly chips in. Swings and roundabouts- the ticket inspector’s zeal balanced by my fellow passenger’s kindness.

    On balance, though, I’m really glad I’m traveling this way- a great chance to watch the world go by, and to get on with things- have had some very productive fettling with the HSC visual identity.